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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to compensate for growing labor costs, U.S. air carriers have
recently increased airfares on flights.1 However, the emergence of lost-cost
carriers (LCCs), who bypass these labor costs, threaten the market
dominance U.S. carriers have exercised over the last decade. Deregulation
and increased liberalization has created a small profit margin that is
threatened by LCCs who do not face the same labor and operating expenses.
Foreign carriers are challenging large U.S. carriers, offering dramatically
lower airfares on transatlantic flights.2 Facing more stringent domestic labor
standards, U.S. carriers have petitioned the U.S. Department of
Transportation (USDOT) to reevaluate granting permits for foreign carriers
with suspect labor practices, generating heightened foreign criticism.3
On July 25, 2016, this criticism came to a head when the European Union
(EU) Commissioner for Transport, Violeta Bulc, formally demanded
arbitration because the USDOT refused to grant Norwegian Air
International’s (NAI) foreign air carrier permit.4 Though the USDOT has
since granted the application, the three-year denial raised significant
concerns about the meaning of Article 17 bis of the U.S.-EU Air Transport
Agreement (ATA or the Agreement), which is the “core labor protection
provisions of the agreement.”5 Whether the USDOT should have granted
NAI a foreign air carrier permit was vigorously contested. U.S. carriers,
labor organizations, and several U.S. politicians argue that NAI violates
express labor standards, which is prohibited under Article 17 bis of the ATA.
Though Article 17 bis may not provide an explicit basis for denying foreign
carrier permits, NAI’s application for a foreign air carrier permit should have
been denied under a proper construction of the article and the USDOT
permit-granting provisions.6
1

Reuters, Your Plane Ticket Just Got More Expensive, FORTUNE (Jan. 6, 2016), http://
fortune.com/2016/01/06/airfares-airlines-prices/.
2
Josh Lew, Norwegian To Launch Sub-$200 Flights from US to Paris, TRAVEL PULSE (Feb.
24, 2016), http://www.travelpulse.com/news/airlines/norwegian-to-launch-sub-200-flights-fromus-to-paris.html.
3
See, e.g., Joint Answer of Delta Air Lines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., and American
Airlines, Inc., Application of Norwegian Air International Limited, Docket DOT-OST-20130204-0027 (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov.
4
Letter from Violeta Bulc, EU Comm’r Transp., to Anthony Foxx, Sec’y Transp., U.S.
Dep’t Transp. (July 25, 2016), https://ialpa.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Com
missioner-Bulc-letter-to-Secretary-Foxx.pdf.
5
John D. Porcari, Setting The Record Straight On Norwegian Air And The US-EU Open
Skies Agreement, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/john-d-porcari/setting-the-record-straig_b_10704160.html.
6
See infra Part III.
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Part II of this Note canvases the trend from closed skies to bilateral
agreements to present day open skies agreements, specifically examining
how the airline industry’s move towards liberalization has undermined
organized labor requiring the creation of Article 17 bis of the ATA. Next,
Part III addresses the respective international labor laws that regulate airline
employees and their collective relationship with management. Part IV
analyzes whether Article 17 bis of the ATA includes the granting of air
carrier certificates, and whether intentional violation of labor standards can
be a basis for denying certification under the ATA. From that analysis, this
Note will argue that the USDOT inappropriately granted NAI’s foreign
carrier permit under Article 17 bis. Finally, in Part V, the Note concludes
with a look towards future considerations for the third phase of the ATA and
the pending U.S. legislation to limit foreign air carrier permits.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: OPENING THE SKIES
While commercial aviation has become routine, the standards and
practices governing the skies remain “stuck in the past.”7 This remains
largely true because much of the foundation for present day air transport
agreements were made in the aftermath of World War II. During the war the
United States began to look ahead “with the hope of using its military aircraft
for civilian purposes.”8 This hope prompted a convention to address these
desires and opened negotiations for air travel cooperation. Nations
simultaneously attempted to open flight routes while limiting foreign
ownership of their air carriers—an issue that remains unsettled today.
Invariably, every move toward open skies between the United States and
Europe correspondingly affected airline workers and their ability to protect
themselves in the changing landscape.
A. Early Moves Towards Bilateral Agreements
In 1944, the United States hosted the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention), bringing together fifty-four other nations.9
At that time, the United States had “a more developed commercial air carrier
industry while European air carriers tended to be government-owned and
7
Charles A. Hunnicutt, U.S.-EU Second Stage Air Transport Agreement: Toward an Open
Aviation Area, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 663, 666 (2011).
8
E. Rebecca Kreis, A Comparative Analysis of the Aviation Network Within the European
Community and the Ad-Hoc Network Between the U.S. and Central America, 24 TRANSP. L.J.
303, 307 (1997).
9
Id.
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focused.”10 This difference became important when recovering nations
rebuked the United States’ push for more liberal aviation rights. In the end,
fifty-two nations agreed to the 1944 Chicago Convention, creating the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)11 under the auspices of the
U.N.
Additionally, the Chicago Convention established the first five “freedoms
of the air.”12 The first two freedoms were universally accepted: the right to
pass over a nation’s territory without landing and the right to land in that
nation for non-traffic purposes.13 Whereas, the latter three freedoms were
not as widely accepted.14 Still, the Chicago Convention provided the
necessary first step for nations to cooperate on subsequent bilateral air
transport agreements, expanding the latter three freedoms and liberalization
going forward.15
The first notable bilateral agreement was between the United Kingdom
and the United States in 1946—Bermuda I. Bermuda I was a bilateral
agreement that reaffirmed first and second freedom rights to its signatories
and extended third, fourth, and fifth freedom rights (a drastic step beyond the
Furthering the push for
agreement at the Chicago Convention).16
liberalization, nations could determine capacity limits for flights so long as
they related to “traffic requirements” on the individual routes and “airline
operation.”17 Rates were tied to the “rate conference machinery” of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA).18 Consequently, Bermuda I
became a template for subsequent bilateral agreements.19

10

Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 667.
Id.
12
Kreis, supra note 8, at 308.
13
Air Services Agreement, U.S.-U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda
I]; Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc 9626, Part 4, INT’L CIV.
AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx.
14
The third freedom of the air is the right to land in the granting nation’s territory for traffic
purposes. A nation granting fourth freedom of the air rights allows a country’s air carriers to
pick up passengers in the foreign nation for purposes of transporting them back to their home
country. Finally, the fifth freedom rights permit a nation to use the granting nation as an
intermediary stop in passage to a third-party nation, allowing the pick-up and drop-off of
passengers along the way. Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc
9626, Part 4, supra note 13.
15
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 668.
16
Id. at 669.
17
Bermuda I, supra note 13, at Annex VI (a)–(c).
18
Id. at Annex II(b). Due to the desire to manage international rates and fares but
impracticability in doing so, governments turned to the IATA (an independent agency) to
determine appropriate rates and fares that would “not involve cut-throat competition, while
ensuring that they could be set as low as possible, in the interests of consumers.” Early Days,
11
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However, the U.K. decided to unilaterally end Bermuda I in 1976, forcing
the United States to agree to stricter measures under Bermuda II just a year
later.20 Bermuda II was hailed as “a successful attempt by the British to
remove some of the excess capacity of United States’ carriers in the United
Kingdom.”21 Under Bermuda II, air carriers were limited to a few gateways
in the opposing country’s airports and had their capacities subject to review
by one another.22 Bermuda II was a protectionist effort to push against the
U.S. airline industry deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s.23 Ultimately,
Bermuda II remained in effect until the signing of the ATA in 2007.24
While bilateral agreements, like Bermuda II, evidenced a global trend
towards protectionism, U.S. policy makers were domestically deregulating
the airline industry. By the 1970s, the civil aviation industry continued to
rely on an antique framework established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
193825 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.26 These acts created a bloated
bureaucracy that sheltered the airline industry from traditional market forces
with elaborate political protections. Under this system, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) was responsible for determining: which airlines could provide
long-haul service, what routes carriers were allowed to fly, and what fares
each carrier could charge for those routes.27 For example, CAB required
elaborate hearings when fare changes were requested to determine whether
the recommended change would be adopted.28 These restrictions were so
stringent that in the forty years since the Civil Aeronautics Act “CAB did not
allow the entry of a single new trunk airline.”29 By 1975, the airline industry
could best be described as “a forty-year old still living at home with his
parents,” explained then CAB Chairman John Robson.30 The airline industry
had outgrown these regulations.

INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASSOC., http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/history-early-days.aspx (last visited
Oct. 6, 2017).
19
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 668–90.
20
See id. at 669.
21
Kreis, supra note 8, at 312.
22
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 669.
23
See infra Part II.B.
24
See infra Part II.D.
25
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
26
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101, 72 Stat. 731, 737–38 (1958).
27
ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES
ARE ENACTED 111 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
28
Id. at 112.
29
Id. at 111. Trunk airline is the name given to commercial airlines certified to fly longhaul service. Id.
30
John Robson, Airline Deregulation: Twenty Years of Success and Counting, REGULATION,
Oct. 1998, at 17, 18.
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B. Deregulation: Unshackling the Airline Industry
Faced with barriers from a non-responsive bureaucratic agency, CAB,
and mounting foreign protectionism, the U.S. Congress passed—and
President Jimmy Carter signed—the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.31
The act made substantive revisions to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by reducing CAB’s control over interstate
and foreign routes. Specifically, CAB was disallowed from approving
agreements that “limit[ed] the level of capacity among air carriers in markets
in which they compete[d], that fixe[d] rates, fares, or charges between or
among air carriers.”32 Additionally, it reemphasized that competition was
paramount, prohibiting approval of agreements that would “reduce[ ] or
elimintate[ ] competition.”33 Moreover, CAB was endowed with the
authority to immunize carriers from antitrust violations.34 The law tried to
reduce barriers carriers faced and “open the industry to competition and
thereby increase economic efficiency and service.”35
Deregulation was met with skepticism and outright opposition from
existing carriers and labor unions.36 Without government protection, many
financially vulnerable carriers feared deregulation would lead to their
collapse.37 Indeed, deregulation had such an effect. Legacy carriers—
Braniff, Eastern, and TWA—were forced out of the market; whereas, small
By 1985,
intrastate carriers expanded into the national market.38
approximately 120 airlines went bankrupt or closed their doors.39 Surviving
carriers were forced to “reinvent themselves.”40 Carriers began offering
loyalty programs and computerized reservation systems to encourage
consumer interest.41 They restructured routes along a hub-and-spoke system,
allowing maximum flight capacity with linked ticket prices for those

31

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, and 49 U.S.C.).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. Though typically viewed as an anticompetitive practice, it was meant to allow further
competition by allowing carriers to freely merge generating more efficient and cost-conscious
moves. The net result being a more competitive market.
35
Kreis, supra note 8, at 312.
36
PATASHNIK, supra note 27, at 113.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 115.
39
Charles G. Moerdler, Deregulation – The United States Experience, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
177, 183 (1989).
40
PATASHNIK, supra note 27, at 115.
41
Id.
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routes.42 During deregulation, ticket fares dropped because legacy carriers
were forced to compete with new market entrants offering simple operations
with “ ‘no frills’ service.”43
One of the biggest market effects was the cannibalization of smaller
airlines by the larger carriers. Prior to deregulation, mergers were scarcely
used, except in situations where a carrier was declaring bankruptcy.44 In the
years following deregulation, mergers were permitted for commercial and
local carriers as well as the creation of marketing alliances.45 This
consolidation of carriers and subsequent alliance structure has survived to the
present day, including foreign carriers. Consolidation was sanctioned by the
government, granting de facto antitrust exemption for alliance compliance, in
the name of economic efficiency.46
Moreover, these bankruptcies and mergers had massive implications for
labor relations. The pre-deregulation regime afforded stability to the airline
industry and organized labor, allowing carriers to afford high labor contracts
by passing the costs on to the consumers through steady fare increases.47
When deregulation finally set in, the industry’s stability was upset, which
caused shockwaves for all stakeholders.48 The industry suffered “[m]assive
lay offs [sic], significant reductions in salaries, two-tiered salary structures,
unprecedented work rule changes, a plethora of labor disputes, and even
‘union busting.’ ”49 No longer amicable negotiating partners, management
and organized labor clashed as both tried to recover from the industry shock.
Former collegiality was abandoned. Organized labor, like the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA), instituted strikes to combat new reforms.50 For
example, in 1985, ALPA conducted a twenty-nine-day strike against United
Air Lines when the airline attempted to create a new tiered pay structure.51
The structure would have paid new hires less than present airline
employees.52 When the strike ended and employees went back to work, the
damage had been done. ALPA continued their active opposition when they
tried to secure ownership in the corporation for greater leverage over

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 118–19.
See generally id.
See Moerdler, supra note 39, at 183.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id.
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management.53 This never completely materialized.54 This combative
takeover approach was a radical move for a labor organization, which
showed the heightened pressure on both sides.
Concurrently, deregulation allowed some airlines to begin a process of
“union busting.” Many nonunion airlines thrived after deregulation while
some unionized airlines used the industry financial crisis to cut out labor
altogether.55 Frank Lorenzo, the man behind Texas Air Corp., gobbled up
bankrupting carriers—Eastern, Continental, Peoples, and Frontier—merging
them into Texas International.56 Through the bankruptcy process, he was
able to eliminate collective bargaining agreements and reduce intensive labor
costs, which allowed him to offer consistently lower prices.57 This policy of
using bankruptcy to bust up unions was made possible by the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Railway Labor Act.
Employees of the airline industry are governed by the Railway Labor Act
(RLA).58 After 1978 the judiciary addressed substantive issues of distressed
airlines and unions facing a potential loss of bargaining power. Before
deregulation airline operating costs had risen, accounting for a substantial
portion of airline’s expenses.59 Deregulation dissolved CAB’s power fix
prices, forcing airlines to offer competitive pricing.60 Competitive pricing
and increased operating expenses that could not be passed along to
consumers caused several air carriers to breakdown.61 Airlines tried to
restructure collective bargaining agreements to avoid collapse. Generally,
labor unions opposed restructuring and would not compromise in order to
reach an agreement, which forced the judiciary to take a more active role.62
Courts were unwilling to force financially compromised air carriers to
become beholden to labor demands at the cost of insolvency. As
53

COREY ROSEN, JOHN CASE & MARTIN STAUBUS, EQUITY: WHY EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IS
GOOD FOR BUSINESS (Harvard Bus. Sch. Press 2005).
54
In 1994 an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) was created, whereby employees
surrendered approximately $4.8 billion in potential wages and benefits in exchange for 55%
(ALPA held this stock alongside the International Association of Machinists and
nonunionized workers) of United’s stock and the power to select three directors on the
corporate board. James P. Miller, United ESOP not Flying High, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 2, 2001).
55
Moerdler, supra note 39, at 180–81.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 183.
58
45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (1996). A more detailed explanation of the RLA is included
below. See infra Part II.
59
Moerdler, supra note 39, at 188.
60
Beth S. Adler, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New Judicial Interpretation
of the Railway Labor Act, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1986).
61
Id. at 1010.
62
Id.
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bankruptcies surged, the courts were forced to adopt rules governing the
abandonment of collective bargaining agreements.63 In cases of insolvency,
courts permitted carriers to reject preexisting collective bargains.
An alternative to bankruptcy was merger. Courts handled mergers and
other attempts at airline survival differently. The court refrained from
adjudicating those matters, deferring to the authority of the National
Mediation Board (NMB) and adjustment boards to make decisions.64
Regardless, the court was sympathetic to carriers on the brink of collapse;
they would prevent labor agreements from stealing the company’s last gasp.
Whereas, in cases involving financially sound airlines, the court consistently
refused to intervene in labor disputes, deferring decisions to the RLA
framework.65
After the dust settled from deregulation, the airline industry normalized.
The shock to the system had caused a massive industry consolidation and
drove perennial carriers into insolvency. Simultaneously, deregulation
strained relations between management and organized labor, creating an
uneasiness and skepticism that still permeates present negotiations between
the parties. In the years following, labor and management continued to
struggle to reach compromises in the face of impending liberalization efforts.
Many industry watchers fear that increased airline liberalization, like
deregulation, will cause reductions in labor protections.

63
In National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held that a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding could reject a
collective bargaining agreement, but the Court splintered over when the debtor could properly
exercise that power. Id. at 1017–18. While the decision explicitly excepted Parties covered by
the RLA, labor unions that remained considered that the decision would be extended to them
in due time. Id. at n.116.
64
In the post-deregulation period, the court regularly denied injunctive requests from labor
organizations trying to impede mergers, self-help remedies, and other attempts to circumvent
collective bargaining agreements. Instead, the court continually reiterated that the proper
authority to address the issues were those outlined in the RLA. See id. at 1021–26; accord
Ass’n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. USAir, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1992)
(denying injunctive relief to AFA after merger airlines rejected application of preexisting
collective bargaining agreement pre-merger); Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Republic Airlines,
Inc., 534 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1982) (refusing to grant an injunction to the manager’s
imposition of “self-help” remedies when negotiations stalled on a new post-merger collective
bargaining agreement); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Texas Int’l Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 423
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 656 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (denying to grant an injunction, the
District Court found that the NMD was the appropriate authority to determine union
certification of the employees in the litigation).
65
Adler, supra note 60, at 1026–27.
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C. “Open Skies” Ahead
Deregulation opened the U.S. domestic airline market, but it did not give
air carriers increased access to international markets. In the wake of
Bermuda II, the United States signed several bilateral air transport
agreements with European nations.66 The new wave of bilateral agreements
was far more liberal, departing from the protectionist structure of Bermuda
II.67 These agreements were the predecessors to the “open skies” agreements
of the 1990s.68 In just five years, the United States had signed twenty-three
new “liberal” bilateral agreements with foreign nations.69
In 1992, the USDOT formally adopted an initiative for negotiating open
skies agreements to increase the liberalization efforts created by the
preexisting bilateral agreements.70 The USDOT solicited input from various
stakeholders, including labor unions.71 From these responses, the department
developed a comprehensive definition of open skies to inform future
agreements. That same year, the United States signed its first bilateral open
skies agreement with the Netherlands.72 The deal represented a crucial step
toward greater liberalization and forced other European nations to the
negotiating table. KLM, a Dutch ‘flagbearer’ carrier, immediately had a
“competitive advantage” under the agreement because it had access to the
entire U.S. market without any gateway restrictions.73 This competitive
advantage had a domino effect; European nations became more willing to
sign open skies agreements, which provided the U.S. carriers with “quasi-

66
In 1978, the U.S. entered three separate bilateral air transport agreements with Belgium,
Netherlands, and Germany. Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 670; Protocol Between the Government
of the United States and the Government of Belgium Relating to Air Transport, U.S.-Belg., Dec.
12–14, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 617; Protocol Relating to the United States of America – Netherlands
Air Transport Agreement of 1957, U.S.-Neth., Mar. 31, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 3088; Protocol Relating
to the United States of America – Federal Republic of Germany Air Transport Agreement of
1955, U.S.-Ger., Nov. 1, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 7323.
67
Christian Hofer & Martin Dresner, The United States - European Union Open Aviation
Area: The American Perspective, 46 J. TRANSP. RES. F. 129, 130 (2007), http://journals.Oreg
ondigital.org/trforum/article/download/1001/896.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Defining “Open Skies”; Order Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19323-01 (Aug. 5,
1992).
71
Id.
72
Jacob A. Warden, “Open Skies” at a Crossroads: How the United States and European
Union Should Use the ECJ Transport Cases to Reconstruct the Transatlantic Aviation
Regime, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 227, 236 (2003).
73
Id. Gateway restrictions are limitations placed on foreign carriers to access certain
locations. Id.
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cabotage”74 across Europe.75 In the years following, the United States
negotiated a total of sixteen additional bilateral open skies agreements.76
However, the European bilateral agreements conflicted with the “Single
European Aviation market”77 Derived from the Single European Act of 1987
(SEA), the model integrated all member states of the European Commission
(EC or Commission) into a “common market.”78 Under the SEA, barriers to
trade were lifted and voting mechanisms were restructured, making
deregulation of the European internal aviation market possible.79 This
resulted in the adoption of a string of reforms known as the “three
packages.”80 While the first regulation had little effect, the second package
granted carriers of Member States greater autonomy in setting fares and gave
them third, fourth, and some fifth freedom rights.81 The third package
brought even greater liberalization to the European market by removing any
“remaining barriers to a free aviation market,” providing Member State
carriers “full cabotage . . . within the collective European Union.”82
When Member States continued to broker individual bilateral open skies
agreements with the United States, the EC feared these agreements were
detrimental to the larger European community. Even the U.K. continued to
negotiate separately with the United States, revising the Bermuda II
agreement four additional times83 after its inception in order to adjust for
airport growth, the exit of TWA and Pan Am from the market,84 and the
advent of code-sharing85 programs.86 Finally, in 1998, the EC challenged
74

Cabotage (also cabotage rights or privileges) is the permission from one country to a
foreign entity, a state or carrier, to transport persons or items through destinations within the
nation. George Firican, The Chicago Conference Documents: Pamphlet on Freedom Rights
and Cabotage, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/Search/pages/results.aspx?k=c
abotage (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
75
Warden, supra note 72, at 236.
76
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 673.
77
Single European Act (1987) created common market and common transport policies that
allowed stringent regulations against member states and a deregulation of the EC internal
market, including aviation. Id.
78
Warden, supra note 72, at 233.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 234.
82
Id.
83
Bermuda II was revised in 1981, 1991, 1995, and then again in 1997 to capture growing
demands in air travel and changes on the U.S. carriers who could access Heathrow airport.
Open Skies Agreement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 30, 2009), https://2009-2017.sta
te.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2009/119760.htm.
84
Both TWA and Pan Am declared bankruptcy, with the latter being bought out by
American Airlines. PATASHNIK, supra note 27.
85
Code sharing is a system by which two or more airlines share a flight number and will
advertise it under both carriers. Id.
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these bilateral open skies agreements in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
as being inherently discriminatory.87 The EC filed actions against seven
Member States: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria,
Germany, and the U.K.88 The EC argued that the agreements brokered
between these nations and the United States infringed on (1) “the external
competence of the Community” and (2) “the provisions of the [EC] Treaty
concerning the right of establishment.”89 The ECJ found that in all the cases,
except that involving the U.K. who had a preexisting agreement, the Member
States were not permitted to enter into a commitment that has already been
determined to be within the discretion of the community.90 Additionally, the
court found the United States’ express refusal rights (for permit grants to
carriers that do not have “substantial ownership” and “effective control” by
the contracting nation) was discriminatory to carriers owned and operated by
Member States in the contracting country.91
In their ruling, the ECJ effectively invalidated the agreements of these
nations. With the rejection of the agreements, a new agreement had to be
struck between the United States and the entire EU.92 The new deal would
replace preexisting bilateral open skies agreements. The EC would then be
able to promote the overall community’s goals, remove possible
discrimination among EU carriers, and ensure the proper exchange of
information.93 This mandate for negotiations between the United States and
the EU became the groundwork for the next stage of open skies
agreements—the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement.

86

See BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION 309 (Wolters Kluwer 2009).
87
Cumulatively the “Open Skies Judgment”: Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom,
2002 E.C.R. I-09427; Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-09519; Case C468/98, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-09575; Case C-469/98, Comm’n v. Finland, 2002
E.C.R. I-09627; Case C-471/98, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-09681; Case C-472/98,
Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. I-09741; Case C-475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002
E.C.R. I-09797; Case C-476/98, Comm’n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-09855 [hereinafter Open
Skies Judgment].
88
European Commission Press Release No. 89/02, The Court of Justice Explains, By These
Judgments, The Distribution of Competence as Regards the Conclusion of International Air
Transport Agreements (Nov. 5, 2002).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Open Skies Judgment, supra note 87.
92
European Commission Press Release IP/03/281, Open Skies: Commission sets out its
international air transport policy (Feb. 26, 2003). Bermuda II remained operational but was
soon replaced by the ATA.
93
Id.
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D. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement
From the remnants of the fractured bilateral agreements, the United States
and EU sought to craft a new compromise that would incorporate the entirety
of the European community. On April 30, 2007, the U.S.-EU Air Transport
Agreement (ATA) was ratified and became effective a year later.94 The
negotiations began five years prior to completion. Initially, the U.S.
Congress opposed early drafts of the agreement, citing concerns over
ownership control, labor, and aviation security.95 From the European
perspective, “[t]he desire . . . to have ownership and control rights in the
United States, and the U.S. government’s inability to grant that access,
delayed and nearly derailed a final accord.”96 Despite this impasse, the 2007
Agreement was eventually passed, but it left many issues unresolved.
1. 2007 Agreement: First Stage Negotiations
Notwithstanding the remaining issues, the 2007 Agreement was
groundbreaking in scope and effect. The Agreement finally recognized a
single European market.97 EU member nations’ carriers were considered
“Community Airlines” who could freely fly to any city in the United States.
Likewise, U.S. carriers were able to fly to and from any city in the EU and
every city in the United States, including EU inauguration flights with
intermediate destinations in the EU before ending in the United States.98
Furthermore, the agreement allowed: prices to be established freely;99
frequency and capacity of flights to adjust with the market;100 sales and
operation offices to be established in the other Party’s territories;101 computer
reservation systems (CRS) to be shared among carriers;102 and competitive
agreements to be established between carriers without fear of losing
routes.103
94
Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Apr. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 [hereinafter 2007
Agreement]. A copy of the U.S.-EU Agreement, along with other significant documents
concerning negotiations, is available at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/e/eu/114768.
htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
95
Christian Westra, The April 2007 U.S.-EU “Open Skies” Agreement: A Dream of
Liberalization Deferred, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 170–71 (2009).
96
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 676.
97
Id.
98
2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 3(1)–(2).
99
Id. art. 13.
100
Id. art. 3(4).
101
Id. art. 10.
102
Id. art. 17.
103
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 677.
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On the other hand, two important issues remained unsolved from the 2007
Agreement: cabotage rights and carrier ownership rights. First, the United
States was given authority to fly between European cities en route to and
from a U.S. city, but EU nations were not able to equally fly between U.S.
cities.104 This meant that EU carriers were still reliant on the alliance
structure to generate multi-city flights passing through the United States.
Second, substantial ownership and control rights of U.S. carriers were still
denied to EU member states and nationals.105 Pursuant to the 2007
Agreement, Annex 4, foreign ownership of equity in a U.S. carrier was
limited to no more than twenty-five percent of a corporation’s voting
shares.106 Additionally, “actual control” of any U.S. carrier was strictly
prohibited for foreigners.107 The Agreement even went so far as to state that
neither 25% of the voting equity nor 49.9% of the total equity was sufficient
to be deemed control of a U.S. carrier.108 Due to these restrictions, the EU
similarly placed limitations on the amount of ownership and control U.S.
nationals could exert on community carriers.109
The concern over reducing foreign ownership restrictions is a concern
largely pushed by U.S. labor organizations. These organizations fear
increased foreign ownership will lead to U.S. labor being replaced with
“cheap, unqualified labor from third countries.”110 In response, liberalization
proponents argue that allowing increased foreign ownership will increase
investment in U.S. airlines and open foreign markets to allow the carriers to
become more competitive worldwide, preventing job loss.111 Due to these
growing concerns from U.S. and European labor organizations, two aviation
forums on liberalization and labor were held before second stage
negotiations could begin.112
The European Commission held the first labor forum on liberalization and
labor in Washington, D.C. in 2008 to discuss the 2007 Agreement and
address its “social effects.”113 The forum included airline labor organization
representatives, U.S. and EU officials, academics, arbitrators, and legal
104

2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 3.
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 678.
106
2007 Agreement, supra note 94, at Annex 4, art. 1.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 711.
111
Id. at 711–12.
112
Id. at 713.
113
European Cockpit Association, First Trans-Atlantic Aviation Labour Forum, https://
www.eurocockpit.be/stories/20081211/first-trans-atlantic-aviation-labour-forum (last visited
Oct. 7, 2017).
105
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experts.114
The opening remarks outlined the present struggle to
simultaneously understand the ramifications of the 2007 Agreement on labor
while generating appropriate protections in the upcoming second stage
negotiations.115 The forum focused on unresolved labor issues associated
with the 2007 Agreement: flooding of cheap labor into higher-priced
markets, growth of “flags of convenience,”116 loss in market share, extensive
industry consolidation, and increased labor forum shopping.117 These issues
remained unaddressed, prompting the parties to meet again less than a year
later in the second labor forum.
In June 2009, organized labor organizations from the United States and
Europe came together again with policy makers and other stakeholders to
further develop solutions for the protection of airline industry employees
with increased liberalization under the forthcoming second stage of the U.S.EU Open Skies agreement.118 A keynote speaker from the International
Labour Organization (ILO) explained that international employee
representation is a “core challenge” that presently lacks a uniform standard
for proper enforcement mechanisms.119 In addressing this critical issue, the
forum put forth several approaches: trans-national agreements with transnational companies, European works councils, multinational conventions,
common labor standards across companies’ operations in multinational
jurisdictions, and the convergence of labor laws of the treaty parties.120

114
John Bruton, Ambassador, Head of Delegation of the European Commission in
Washington, Opening Speech to the Labour Forum (Dec. 3, 2008).
115
Id.
116
Originally applied to the maritime industry, “Flags of Convenience” is a term coined by
the International Transport Workers’ Federation that denotes an air carrier that registers itself
and its aircrafts (“plants its flag”) in a different nation to capture a more advantageous law.
Flags of Convenience, INT’L TRANSP. WORKERS’ FEDERATION, http://www.itfglobal.org/en/tra
nsport-sectors/civil-aviation/in-focus/focs-in-aviation/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). Generally,
the carrier will have reduced fees and taxes and can sometimes enjoy laxer labor standards
than what might exist in its natural home country. Id.
117
Douglas Lavin, Reg’l Vice Pres. N. Am. IATA, The Need for Change, EU-US Aviation
Forum on Liberalisation and Labour: Past, Present and Future (Dec. 4, 2008), summary
available at https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/events/doc/douglas_
lavin_iata.pdf
118
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU-U.S. SECOND AVIATION FORUM ON LIBERALISATION AND
LABOUR: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (June 22–23 2009), https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transp
ort/files/modes/air/events/doc/2009_06_22_executive_summary.pdf [hereinafter SECOND
AVIATION FORUM].
119
Id. at 2.
120
Id. at 3–6.
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The first approach, voluntary trans-national agreements, like international
framework agreements121 and European Framework Agreements, allow
trans-national companies to make independent contracts with employees
without relying on national governments.122 Airlines KLM and EasyJet have
both used these in the past. The former used an agreement to maintain
preexisting labor arrangements when they merged with Air France; the latter
relied on these agreements to create jurisdiction-specific agreements to
accommodate local labor conditions.123 However, these agreements are
limited in their use because they lack a formal enforcement mechanism that
is accepted globally.124
The second recommended approach was to expand the present use of
European Works Councils (EWCs) even further.125 While the EWCs cannot
substitute for formal union and management negotiations platforms, these
employee bodies allow a clear dialogue, so employees are kept informed of
formal negotiations procedures.126 They are particularly helpful when used
alongside other approaches like the aforementioned trans-national
agreements.127
Next, a multinational convention was recommended to solve the concern
over international labor representation. Like the Chicago Convention,
nations could agree to certain standards for the regulation of airline workers
across the board. During the forum, commentators primarily relied on the
Maritime Labour Convention as an exemplar to be followed.128 Under a
similar convention, minimum standards for employment conditions, health
and safety protections, wages and hours, and various other issues could be
established.129 Yet, creation of a convention would require the ILO to begin
extensive debates, spanning several years, and would require a two-thirds
vote from the members to establish, making it an unlikely approach.130

121

International framework agreements (IFAs) are bargains struck between a multinational
enterprise and a Global Union Federation (GUF), establishing the same standards for how the
company will conduct itself in all the countries it operates. Dominique Michel, International
Framework Agreements: A Global Tool for Supporting Rights at Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG.
(Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_080723/lan
g--en/index.htm.
122
SECOND AVIATION FORUM, supra note 118, at 3.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 4.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 4–5.
129
Id. at 5.
130
Id. at 2.
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The last two approaches looked generally at how common labor standards
could be generated or present standards converged into a universally binding
set of rules.131 Like trans-national agreements, the common labor standards
approach creates uniform standards within a single company regardless of
the jurisdiction in which it’s operating.132 Nations can create this uniformity
through declarations, treaties, or trans-national agreements; whereas, a
convergence of laws binds companies carrying the flags of the participating
nations.133
Most of the focus in the forum was on the forthcoming second stage
negotiations.134 The concern was whether the agreement could be amended
to include a “recognition of existing arrangements,” while simultaneously
providing protection for the four fundamental labor rights—the ability to
organize, negotiate, agree, and enforce collectively—under a clear
negotiations framework.135 A single European labor law, akin to the U.S.
Railway Labor Act,136 would be the best framework for ensuring these
fundamentals, according to ALPA representatives.137 If this was possible,
then progress might be viable in creating a substantive protection for
employee representation.
Like foreign ownership rights and extended cabotage, these issues were
left unresolved, but the parties agreed to return to them during “second stage
negotiations.”138 The parties followed up these labor forums and began
working on the second stage negotiations almost immediately.139 Ultimately,
the 2010 Agreement failed to include any decisive protection for the
fundamental labor rights laid out during the Labor Forum, and the
Agreement did not create any new framework for controlling labor
representation abroad.140 The Agreement, however, did create social
protections never before included in any air transport agreement, including
Article 17 bis labor protections.141

131

Id. at 5.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 5–6.
135
Id. at 6.
136
See infra Part II.
137
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 716.
138
2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 21. In fact, under the provisions of the agreement
future negotiations were required to begin within eighteen months and conclude a second
stage agreement within twelve months from then; otherwise, either Party could unilaterally
suspend the rights conferred in the agreement. Id.
139
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 680.
140
Id. at 717–18.
141
Id. at 718.
132
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2. 2010 Agreement: Second Stage Negotiations
The 2007 Agreement went into effect on March 30, 2008.142 The
agreement was met with warm reception. Jacques Barrot, Vice-President of
the European Commission of Transports, stated, “[t]his marks the start of a
new era in transatlantic aviation. This agreement will bring more
competition and cheaper flights to the US.”143 Despite this reception, the
parties remained resolved to further liberalize the transatlantic airline
markets. The United States wanted to continue to create competitive
structures for U.S. carriers; whereas, the EU continued to advance their
objective of creating a “transatlantic Open Aviation Area.”144 By 2010, the
parties sought to make strides in these areas in passing the second stage
agreement (2010 Agreement).
On June 24, 2010, the 2010 Agreement was provisionally put into
effect.145 Using the foundation of the 2007 Agreement, the revisions created
more opportunities for investment and access to the airline market.146 In
approving the 2010 Agreement, the parties made the ATA permanent.
Additionally, the 2010 Agreement made substantive revisions for
cooperating on safety, security, the environment, and labor.147 The last of
these measures, labor, was captured as the “social dimension” of the
agreement in Article 17:
1.

2.

The Parties recognise the importance of the social
dimension of the Agreement and the benefits that arise
when open markets are accompanied by high labour
standards. The opportunities created by the Agreement
are not intended to undermine labour standards or the
labour-related rights and principles contained in the
Parties’ respective laws.
The principles in paragraph 1 shall guide the Parties as
they implement the Agreement, including regular
consideration by the Joint Committee, pursuant to

142
European Commission Press Release IP/08/474, EU-US Open Skies: A New Era in
Transatlantic Aviation Starts on 30 March (Mar. 28, 2008).
143
Id.
144
Id. The transatlantic Open Aviation Area is understood to mean “a single air transport
market between the EU and the US with free flows of investment and no restrictions on air
services, including access to the domestic markets of both parties.” Id.
145
International Aviation: United States, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/transp
ort/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/united_states_en.htm.
146
Id.
147
Id.
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Article 18, of the social effects of the Agreement and
the development of appropriate responses to concerns
found to be legitimate.148
This provision represented a “historic breakthrough” because of its “explicit
commitment to high labor standards,” and the obligations it placed on parties
to not intentionally undermine labor standards, which had never been
previously done.149
The 2010 Agreement made large strides in the continued liberalization of
the airline market. However, the same issues that remained unaddressed
after the 2007 Agreement were still left open again: U.S. restrictions on
foreign ownership and control rights and EU rights to fly between the United
States and non-EU nations.150 These considerations were largely left up to
the parties to address through the Joint Committee. Therefore, the
commitment to a “shared goal of continuing to remove market barriers to
maximize benefits for consumers, airlines, labour, and communities” would
have to be realized through the subsequent interpretation of Article 17 bis.151
Such an opportunity arose when the USDOT rescinded its initial approval of
NAI’s foreign carrier permit.
III. LABOR STANDARDS OF THE ATA SIGNATORIES
Under Article 17 bis of the ATA, both parties are obligated to not
intentionally undermine “labour standards or the labour-related rights and
principles contained in the Parties’ respective laws.”152 To understand the
breadth of Article 17 bis, the standards, rights, and principles of the Parties’
laws must be ascertained. There are substantive similarities among the
parties’ labor standards, including rights for collective bargaining.
Procedurally the parties create and enforce labor standards very differently.
One critical difference between the parties is the clarity of labor principals as
they pertain to relations among employers and employees.

148

Memorandum of Consultations on a Protocol to Amend the Air Transp. Agreement
Between the U.S. and the European Cmty. and Its Member States (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter
2010 Agreement], http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/139411.pdf.
149
Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 681.
150
Id. at 682.
151
European Commission Press Release IP/03/281, supra note 92.
152
2010 Agreement, supra note 148.
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A. U.S. Controlling Law: Railway Labor Act
The paramount law governing labor standards—specifically collective
bargaining—for U.S. air carriers is the RLA.153 Originally passed in 1926 to
address national railways, the RLA was extended to cover the emerging
airline industry in 1936.154 Like the nation’s railroads, the airline industry
represented a delicate market that needed room to grow without harsh
regulatory barriers, while simultaneously supporting massive numbers of
workers with unique and demanding working hours and conditions.155
Hence, the aim of the RLA is to “promote collective bargaining and to
prevent major slowdowns in [the airline industry] integral to the smooth
functioning of national commerce.”156 The NMB was created to minimize
industry-wide slowdowns that might cripple the national economy.157
Under the RLA, the NMB handles clashes between labor organizations
and employers.158 Typically, the Board acts as an arbitrator settling “minor”
disputes, while acting in a “non-binding mediation role in major [ ]
disputes.”159 Courts generally defer to the NMD on minor disputes, making
the Board’s authority in these cases essentially compulsory.160 Whereas, the
Board’s role in major disputes—when negotiations stall between labor
organizations and management and there is a potential for strike—is to
mediate between the parties.161 If the parties cannot reach a resolution after
the required cooling period, then both parties can take appropriate measures,
including employees striking and management locking-out employees or
imposing new rules.162 However, where a strike might cause costly
deprivations of necessary services, an emergency ad hoc board can be
appointed to investigate and make recommendations to the President, during

153

45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (1982).
Adler, supra note 60, at 1005.
155
Lawrence J. Kelly, Is that “Whoosh” You Hear a New Whispher-Jet Whisking Across
U.S. Skies, or the Perotvian “Sucking-Sound” of Jobs Leaving the Country?, 14 LAW & BUS.
REV. AM. 699, 708 (2008).
156
Adler, supra note 60, at 1005.
157
Kelly, supra note 155.
158
Id.
159
Id. Under the RLA “minor disputes” involve “interpretation or application of an existing
agreement.” Adler, supra note 60, at 1008. Whereas, “major disputes” concern negotiating
new or amending existing collective bargain agreements. Id. at 1005. Neither of these terms
are explicitly stated in the RLA statutory language; however, the U.S. Supreme Court,
interpreting the RLA in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), relied on these
distinctions in defining the scope of the Board’s authority. Id. at n.20.
160
Kelly, supra note 155, at 708.
161
Id.
162
Id.
154
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which time the parties must maintain the status quo.163 If after all this the
parties cannot reach a satisfactory resolution, then the President or Congress
may be able to intervene to direct the “outcome of the impasse.”164
B. European Union Labor Law
Like the United States, individual EU nations (with one exception165)
maintain their own labor laws codified in various statutes. As members of
the EU, each nation must meet certain minimum standards under the Treaty
on the EU.166 The Treaty allows the EU’s minimum standards to be adopted
through “directives,” and individual member states can enhance these labor
provisions as they deem fit.167 Once directives have been incorporated in the
national laws of the member states, national courts are obligated to “interpret
law as consistent with European law,” considering both the law’s wording
and purpose.168 The European Commission ensures these directives are
incorporated into the member states’ national laws, and they continuously
monitor the implementation of these rules.169 If a country is deemed to have
“lacking or incorrect implementation of regulations,” then the Commission
may seek redress in the ECJ.170
The directives promulgated by the Commission have generally focused
on creating minimum standards in a few critical areas. The Commission’s
directives typically aim to preserve freedom of contract, minimum standards
for employee protections and working conditions, equal treatment and nondiscrimination policies, and free collective bargaining and collective
action.171 Standards of minimum wage, however, are generally held to be
within the purview of collective bargain agreements between employee
unions and management.172 These standards seek to “promote social
163

Id. at 709.
Id.
165
France contains a unified Code of Labor Law. Manfred Löwisch, Labor Law in Europe,
20 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 102 (2003).
166
The Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, did not
explicitly create any new labor standards; however, it did recognize existing European
Community law from the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the
Single European Act. Id. Additional revisions to the Maastricht Treaty added more relevant
labor standards. See Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty, and Lisbon Treaty.
167
Labour Law, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157 (last
visited Oct. 7, 2017).
168
Löwisch, supra note 165, at 104.
169
Labour Law, supra note 167.
170
Löwisch, supra note 165, at 103.
171
Id. at 104–05.
172
Id. at 105.
164
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progress and improve the living and working conditions of the people of
Europe,”173 while preserving some national autonomy. Unlike the United
States, this belief permeates throughout EU labor law at all levels.
Furthermore, EU member states have adopted certain labor standards by
multilateral agreements or as required for membership in certain
organizations. For example, under the ILO, which all EU members have
ratified, employees’ right to collectively bargain is recognized and
incorporated into those nations’ domestic laws.174 Additionally, in the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights Member States recognize employees’ rights
to freely associate and workers’ rights to be informed and consult one
another in that association.175 Lastly, the EU Charter itself creates a strong
recognition on the necessity for social dialogue under Article 138.176 These
various authorities have created both an internal and community-wide set of
labor standards that Member States generally recognize and are expected to
adhere to when negotiating with labor.
C. Preemption of Treaties and Other Joint Measures Affecting Labor
Standards
In addition to the labor laws of the United States and the EU, there are
other bodies that provide a general framework for labor relations in the
airline industry. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) allows nations around the globe to collaborate on
standards for business conduct worldwide.177 The goal of the OECD is not
singular advancement of labor above all other interests; instead, it strives for
the “highest sustainable economic growth and employment” to contribute to
the world economy at large.178
OECD establishes guidelines for conducting labor relations and proper
Like most national laws, the guidelines
employment practices.179
recommend recognition of employees’ rights to collectively bargain and

173

Labour Law, supra note 167.
See ILO, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, ILO Convention No.
98 (July 1, 1949), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12
100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243:NO.
175
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 27, 2012 O.J. C 326/02, at
401; id. art. 28.
176
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art. 138,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
177
Kelly, supra note 155, at 713.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 713–14.
174
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unionize.180 More importantly though, the guidelines spell out that
employers should employ standards that are “not less favourable [sic] than
those observed by comparable employers in the host country.”181 While
these guidelines are helpful to its member nations, they are limited in value.
OECD guidelines cannot supersede a nation’s duly enacted labor or
employment laws nor does the OECD possess an enforcement body to check
whether the policies are being properly administered.182 Instead, OECD can
rely on nothing more than moral suasion. While the OECD does not have
any enforcement power, Article 17 bis empowers nations to implement the
ATA in accordance with those labor laws and principals, including OECD
guidelines ascribed to by the signatory nations.
IV. ARTICLE 17 BIS PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
Under Article 17 bis, the parties must not implement the ATA in such a
way that would undermine labor standards or the other parties’ labor laws.183
The language of Article 17 bis has been arguably unclear about the
provision’s scope of obligation and effect on the remainder of the
Agreement, which raises three separate issues. The first issue is whether
Article 17 bis imposes a legal obligation on parties to consider one another’s
labor standards, rights, and principles while carrying out their duties under
the Agreement. Second, assuming that obligation exists, does it extend to the
authorization of foreign air carrier permits under Article 4? For instance,
would authorization of a carrier permit to an airline violating a Party’s labor
standards, rights, or principles be tantamount to intentionally implementing
the agreement to undermine those standards (thereby violating Article 17 bis
proscriptions)? Finally, if the first two are answered affirmatively, then the
issue is whether the USDOT’s authorization of NAI’s foreign carrier permit
was a violation of Articles 4 and 17 bis, considering their external hiring
practices.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Text of Article 17 bis Creates a Legal
Obligation
Article 17 bis is more than a hortatory recognition of the value of high
labor standards. Instead, it imposes an obligation on all parties to the
Agreement to carry out their duties without intentionally undermining one
180
181
182
183

Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 713.
2010 Agreement, supra note 148.
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another’s preexisting labor standards, rights, and principles. Under the plain
meaning of Article 17 bis, the text in paragraph one establishes the labor
principles both parties recognize; whereas, the second paragraph imposes
obligations on the parties. The provision’s two paragraphs must be read in
harmony as a single directive that binds all signatories to the Agreement.
That directive is a legal obligation on all parties to carry out their duties
under the ATA without intentionally undermining preexisting labor
standards. This construction is buttressed with the parties’ clear statements
of intention and purpose, the surrounding negotiations, and the positive
policy rationales.
An interpretation of a treaty “begins with its text.”184 Words are to be
given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the treaty text provides a clear
definition or the drafter’s contrary intent is shown.185 The context of the
words may provide additional meaning to the terms.186 Treaties should be
liberally construed and not limited to constrained meanings.187 If the text
remains ambiguous despite the language’s clear meaning, then the parties
may look outside the four corners of the document, including previous drafts
of the provision, negotiation history, and the construction adopted by the
parties.188 Moreover, it may be necessary to consider the entire context of

184

Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the
interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506
(2008))); accord Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 325(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1987) (“An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”).
185
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (“The clear import of
treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its
signatories.’ ” (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963))).
186
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1991) (“When interpreting a
treaty, [this Court begins] ‘with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used.’ ” (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
699 (1988))).
187
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (“[T]reaties are construed more liberally
than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by
the parties.” (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32
(1943))).
188
Id.; Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“[W]e have traditionally
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux
préparatoires) and the postratification understanding of the contracting parties.”).
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the agreement when construing the language to properly effectuate the
overall purpose of the agreement.189
The plain meaning of the Article 17 bis text must be ascertained by
reading the two paragraphs in context. In the first sentence of paragraph one
of Article 17 bis, the drafters explicitly recognize the complementary value
of high labor standards with opening markets.190 In the second sentence, the
drafters elaborate on this correlation: the opportunities produced from the
airline industry liberalization are “not intended to undermine labour
standards or the labour-related rights and principles contained in the Parties’
respective laws.”191 Read alone, paragraph one neither creates nor imposes
any obligation on the parties whatsoever. At most, paragraph one appears to
state plainly the parties’ intentions and purposes. However, paragraph one
cannot be read in isolation.
Under traditional maxims of treaty construction, the entire provision
should be read together to derive its meaning.192 In fact, paragraph two
directly references the principles stated in paragraph one.193 The second
paragraph’s meaning is, therefore, inherently tied to the first paragraph’s
text. The plain text of the second paragraph states, “The principles in
paragraph [one] shall guide the Parties as they implement the Agreement.”194
There is no clear definition of the “principles” in paragraph one, which are to
animate the parties’ actions. Similarly, it is unclear how these “principles”
specifically affect the practices of the parties as they implement the ATA.
While “shall” generally has a legal definition, there is no express definition
for either “guide” or “implement” in the Agreement. However, the meaning
of this sentence is clarified when it is read within the context of Article 17
bis and the ATA as a whole.
The “principles” encapsulated in paragraph one refer to the breadth of
preexisting labor standards, rights, and principles of the signatories. In the
first instance, the statement is vague about which “principles” in paragraph
one it denotes. There are at least three possible options. The most tangible
meaning would be the express “labour standards or the labour-related rights
and principles contained in the Parties’ respective laws.”195 In other words,
189
Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“[W]e must ‘examine not only the language, but the entire context of agreement.’ ” (quoting
Great-West Life Assur. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 180, 183 (1982))).
190
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
191
Id.
192
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666 (1992) (deriving meaning of an
article for extradition enforcement from the surrounding articles language and meaning).
193
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
194
Id. (emphasis added).
195
Id.
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principles include those standards that have been codified into positive law
by any of the parties. Whereas, the more abstract view might be that
“principles” refer to high labor standards in general. A third and final view
might assume that “principles” means the conjunction of high labor
standards and open markets stated in the opening sentence of the provision.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “principle” can be defined as
“[a] fundamental truth or proposition on which others depend”; “a general
statement or tenet forming the (or a) basis of a system of belief”; or “[a]
primary assumption forming the basis of a chain of reasoning.”196 Either of
these three views could conform to the plain meaning of principles under at
least one of these three definitions, so the ambiguity remains.
Nevertheless, this ambiguity can be easily reconciled. The two sentences
of paragraph one parallel one another. The drafters make a clear statement
of intention in the first sentence, recognizing the conjunction of “open
markets” and “high labor standards.”197 The second sentence makes a
similar dichotomy between “opportunities” (a byproduct of open markets)
and the parties’ preexisting labor standards and labor-related rights and
principles.198 The parallel structure indicates that the parties believe their
preexisting standards and laws are “high labor standards.” So, a Party can
uphold high labor standards by complying with one another’s preexisting
labor laws. Assuming “principles” refer to only the Parties’ preexisting labor
laws provides a tangible basis for evaluating compliance. Assessing the
more abstract view, labor standards would equally require a barometer for
compliance, which would be assessed under the Parties’ preexisting labor
laws anyway. Finally, the third interpretation cannot properly be denoted a
principle since it merely describes the relative benefits of a relationship
rather than a foundation of belief like a law provides. Hence, “principles” in
paragraph two refers to the whole body of preexisting labor standards, rights,
and principles of the signatory nations.
Turning to the next issue, the word “shall” has traditionally been
understood to impose a duty on a Party.199 Like a contract, a treaty may
impose obligations, binding each nation to the treaty.200 “Shall” can in some
contexts obfuscate the meaning of whether a duty is discretionary or

196

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017).
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
198
Id.
199
BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 939–41 (2d ed. Oxford U.
Press 1995).
200
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014) (“As a general
matter, a treaty is a contract, though between nations.”).
197
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mandatory;201 however, the meaning here must be deemed mandatory
because of the context in which it is used. The first paragraph one explicitly
states that the Parties’ intention is to not actively undermine labor standards,
rights, and principles encapsulated in the Parties’ laws.202 When read
together with paragraph two, the second paragraph’s meaning becomes
clearer. Treating the language as discretionary would make the provision, at
a minimum, devoid of effect—an interpretation that should be avoided.203
Under a traditional canon of treaty construction, the text should be construed
to avoid making provisions meaningless or superfluous.204 At worst, such an
interpretation would produce absurd results. If the Parties were permitted to
intentionally undermine the labor laws of the other nations, then the Parties
are permitted to act contrary to the clear statement of their own intention.
This interpretation would hollow out the whole spirit of the Agreement and
make Article 17 bis useless. The plain meaning of “shall” must be construed
as mandatory to avoid such irrational results.
Unlike “shall,” there is no clear legal meaning for “guide” or
“implement.” “Guide” is defined as “to direct the course of [an instrument
or action]”; “[t]o lead or direct in a course of action, in formation of
opinions . . .”; or “to determine the course or direct of [events].”205
“Implement” means “[t]o complete, perform, carry into effect [an
agreement]” or “to fulfill (an engagement or promise).”206 Considering these
definitions, paragraph two states that the principles in paragraph one
(preexisting labor standards, rights, and principles) must direct or lead the
behavior of the Parties as they perform or complete the Agreement. This
interpretation necessarily raises two possible results: the provision is either
an obligatory directive or a passive influencer. Depending on which result
controls, the provision may create an uncertain level of obligation on the
Parties. The remaining language of the provision clarifies this ambiguity.
The context surrounding the inclusion of Article 17 bis shows the
drafter’s intention and purpose was to create an obligatory directive not to
intentionally undermine the Parties’ labor standards. The explicit language
201

The term has generally fallen out of favor in many legal circles, being replaced by words
like “must” or “may,” as appropriate. See REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK,
OFFICE OF THE FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., FEDERAL, at iii (Oct. 1998)
(“[W]e use ‘must’ instead of ‘shall’ because ‘must’ imposes a legal obligation.”).
202
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
203
Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We have said, however,
that [t]reaties, like statutes, should be construed so that no words are treated as being
meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” (internal quotations omitted)).
204
Id.
205
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 196.
206
Id.
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of paragraph one recognizes the benefit of high labor standards, stating “The
opportunities created by the Agreement are not intended to undermine labour
standards or the labour‐related rights and principles contained in the Parties’
respective laws.”207 This statement clearly confirms the purpose of Article
17 bis was to ensure that neither Party would intentionally act to undermine
labor standards. While the word choice seems to permit unintentional
undermining of labor standards, the overall language shows a definitive
purpose to try and control intentional Party acts. Besides, where a Party
ratifies an international agreement, it is demonstrating formal consent to be
bound by the language of the document.208 Thus, by ratifying the Agreement
language, the Parties are presumed to approve and consent to being bound by
said intention. Moreover, a Party intentionally undermining a co-Party’s
labor standards would rebuke the very explicit statement of intention
ascribed by both Parties in paragraph one,209 which if permitted yields an
illogical outcome. Under the plain meaning of the text and surrounding
context, Parties to the ATA have an affirmative duty to implement the
agreement without intentionally undermining labor standards, rights, and
principles of the Parties.
Furthermore, even if there was not a clear statement of intention
confirming an interpretation of obligation on the Parties, it is a rule of treaty
construction that they should be construed liberally.210 Article 17 bis can be
interpreted broadly to either create a right or not. If the language of Article
17 bis is viewed as merely a hortatory statement of support for high labor
standards, then Parties are denied a right of enforcement when those
standards are diminished. Instead, a more liberal construction would
interpret the article to create a separate right of enforcement; whereby, a
Party can act when another nation to the Agreement intentionally undermines
labor standards. On the other hand, paragraph two does contemplate “regular
consideration . . . of the societal effects of the Agreement” by the Joint
Commission.211
Nevertheless, this should not be construed as a limit on the remedial
powers of the Parties nor should it be viewed as reducing the obligation on
the Parties to refrain from intentionally undermining labor standards. The
207

2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
Avero Belgium Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Although a
State’s consent to be bound by an international agreement can take many forms, including
formal accession to the treaty’s provisions after the treaty has already entered into force,
ratification remains the most common form . . . by which a state becomes bound by an
international agreement.” (internal citation omitted)).
209
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
210
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985).
211
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
208
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Joint Commission (JC or the Commission) is the primary mechanism for
resolving conflicts arising from the Agreement and creating cooperation and
evaluating implementation of the Agreement.212 The Commission is not
responsible for implementing the Agreement; instead, the Commission
facilitates the Parties’ cooperation as each carries out the Agreement. The
Commission can act as a method for remedying purported violations of the
Agreement, but its authority is not exclusive. Therefore, under a liberal
construction, Parties are obligated to implement the Agreement without
intentionally violating Article 17 bis, but if a Party does violate it, then the
opposing Party may enforce its rights through the Commission.
Under the U.S. judicial approach to treaty interpretation, extrinsic
evidence may additionally be considered to discern the meaning of a treaty,
including the treaty’s history, prior negotiations, and practical construction
by the Parties themselves.213 The first round of negotiations began with
Daniel Calleja, Director of Air Transport for the European Commission,
noting that providing protection for labor standards was one of three large
concerns left over from the first stage of the ATA.214 Later that year he
would echo the same concerns about labor in a speech to the International
Aviation Club.215 These concerns permeated through each round of the
negotiations with special attention being given to the views espoused by
labor stakeholders in the second labor forum.216 In fact, labor concerns were
one of the only issues that were addressed so vigorously in the interim
between the 2007 Agreement and the 2010 amendments. Drafters and other
stakeholders involved in the two forums were unified in their insistence for
tangible labor protections abroad, fearing that liberalization would reduce
preexisting standards.217 The ATA negotiation history reinforces an
interpretation of Article 17 bis that favors imposing an obligation on Parties
to not act intentionally to undermine preexisting labor standards.
On the other hand, there is no practical construction to Article 17 bis.
Through the conflict over NAI’s permit application, the Parties have their
first opportunity to interpret the language of Article 17 bis. Both Parties
largely maintained opposing views of Article 17 bis enforcement power.
212

2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 18.
See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
214
Daniel Calleja, Dir. Air Transp., Directorate-Gen. for Energy and Transport, Euro.
Comm. Presentation EU-US Second Stage: The Future of Transatlantic Aviation (May 15,
2008).
215
Daniel Calleja, Dir. Air. Transp., Eur. Comm’n, Speech to the International Aviation
Club: EU-US Aviation: Rising to the Challenges (Sept. 23, 2008).
216
Negotiations on a Second Stage EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement, Joint Statement from
the European and U.S. Delegations.
217
SECOND AVIATION FORUM, supra note 118.
213

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

544

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

4/18/2018 1:56 PM

[Vol. 46:515

Despite this conflict, the plain language and clear intent of the Parties show
Article 17 bis was not meant to be a meager nod to the concerns of labor,
but, instead, was meant to be a controlling principle in the Parties’ actions
under the Agreement.
Nonetheless, general counsel for the USDOT argues that paragraph two
of Article 17 bis is “essentially hortatory” and should not be understood to
impose any legal obligation on the Parties.218 Likewise, counsel for the
Department of State argues, “[Article 17 bis] does not authorize actions that
would run counter to express legal obligations of the Parties under other
provisions of the Agreement—such as the obligation . . . to grant a permit
where Article 4’s requirements are satisfied.”219 Yet, each of these fails to
accept the plain language of the provision and clearly stated objective to take
no intentional action to undermine labor standards of the respective nations.
As noted above, the USDOT argument that the language was meant as only a
general observance of the value of high labor standards would make the
entire Article merely superfluous, which is contrary to maxims of treaty
interpretation. Additionally, the State Department’s argument fails to
appreciate that, taken in its plain and ordinary meaning, the requirements of
Article 4 could not be properly satisfied without passing Article 17 bis
explicit prohibition against intentionally conflicting labor decisions. The
drafters of Article 17 bis are clear that their intention was to protect labor
standards, and the Parties have a duty to do nothing that would intentionally
undermine that protection.
B. The Legal Obligation Under Article 17 bis Extends to Article 4
Authorizations
Since Article 17 bis imposes a duty on the Parties to not intentionally
undermine labor standards through the Agreement processes, the USDOT is
not permitted to grant a foreign air carrier permit under Article 4 if Article 17
bis is violated. The criteria for authorizing foreign air carrier permits
includes national standards for review, which in the United States means a
holistic and public examination of the public interest in authorizing the
permit. This approach, at least with regards to the U.S. domestic law,
arguably compels the USDOT to deny a foreign air carrier permit for an
airline shirking preexisting labor standards.
218

Letter from Kathryn B. Thompson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. to Karl R. Thompson,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: DOT Legal Analysis
of Article 17 bis of the U.S.-EU Aviation Agreement (Mar. 17, 2016).
219
Letter from Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State to Karl Thompson, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel (Apr. 13, 2016).
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Article 17 bis applies to the entire ATA. The drafters put no limitations
on the provision’s applicability, and the Article clearly states that the duty
applies throughout the entirety of the Agreement’s implementation.220
Comparably, other amended provisions are limited in their scope by express
language to a referenced article or annex, but Article 17 bis makes no such
limitation.221 For example, Article 6 bis is made “pursuant to Article 4,” and
Article 15 must be read “in accordance with Article 2 and 3(4).”222 No
limiting principle for its application is provided in the text of Article 17 bis,
so it would apply to authorizations under Article 4. Additionally, Article 17
bis can be read in harmony with the entirety of the other provisions of the
Agreement. Nothing in either the 2007 Agreement or the 2010 Amendment
makes explicit reference to Article 17 bis or rejects its broad application.223
Thus, it presumably applies to all provisions of the ATA.
Under Article 4, Parties must grant certificates to foreign air carriers
seeking authorization who meet the requisite standards. The Party must
grant authorization if the airline demonstrates: (1) it is owned and controlled
by the appropriate state; (2) it is “qualified to meet the conditions prescribed
under the laws and regulations” normally considered by the granting
authority; and (3) it meets the provisions of Article 8 (safety) and Article 9
(security).224 The first standard is defined in Annex 4 to the ATA, explaining
ownership and control requirements generally under the Agreement.
Likewise, the third element’s requirements, safety and security standards, are
provided in Articles 8 and 9 respectively. The second standard is not defined
in the Agreement because its content derives from the laws and regulations
of the nation authorizing the foreign air carrier permit. Accordingly, Article
17 bis is most applicable in element two—the Parties’ preexisting
qualifications and conditions for authorization.
Specifically, an airline applying to the USDOT for a foreign air carrier
permit to fly routes into the United States would be evaluated on an overall
standard—“a public interest test.”225 For authorization to be granted, the
airline must demonstrate citizenship and fitness. An airline can prove
citizenship by demonstrating it is substantially owned and effectively
controlled by an appropriate state or a national of that state. Fitness includes
220

2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
See id. art. 5 (“provided for in Article 3” and “with respect to application of paragraph 6
of Article 11”).
222
Id.
223
2007 Agreement, supra note 94; 2010 Agreement, supra note 148.
224
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.
225
Office of Int’l Aviation Foreign Air Carrier Licensing Div., Foreign Air Carrier
Information Packet, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Sept. 2000), https://www.transportation.gov/site
s/dot.dev/files/docs/Foreign_Carrier_Information_Packet.pdf.
221
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both operational and financial fitness as well as a disposition to “comply
with the laws, regulations, and requirements which govern the operation of
such services.”226 Nonetheless, these determinations are not dispositive of
whether a foreign air carrier permit is granted because the USDOT will
consider additional factors. For example, when an airline applies for
authorization, the application is made public, and interested Parties may
comment on the proposed authorization.227 This commentary—responsive
pleadings filed by external Parties—may be considered in the overall
weighing of whether to grant a carrier an authorization.228
When weighed together for the public interest test, the USDOT must deny
authorization to an airline that demonstrates labor practices that undermine
the standards approved by either the United States, EU, or the member states.
Expressly, the “merits of any responsive pleadings . . . filed to the
application” may be properly considered in evaluating the public interest.229
In cases where the pleadings show an airline has consciously subverted labor
standards, Article 17 bis bars authorization because granting the application
would intentionally undermine those standards. Arguably, granting such an
application may only reflect a decision that, at most, knowingly undermined
standards or just consciously disregarded them, failing to rise to the level of
intentionality. Yet, the purpose of Article 17 bis is to prevent flagrant
circumvention of labor standards, so intentionality should be read to include
these lessor culpabilities.230 Hence, under the public interest analysis, the
USDOT is compelled to deny those applications where improper labor
practices are found to exist.
However, in the 2010 Amendment the Joint Committee approved
procedures to provide reciprocal recognition of the opposite Parties’
regulatory determinations, including citizenship and fitness.231 Whereby, the
USDOT should “not inquire further” except where there is a “specific reason
for concern” that the standards of Article 4 have not been met.232 This
226
Office of the Sec’y of Transp., Office of Int’l Aviation, Procedures for the Reciprocal
Recognition of Regulatory Determinations with Regard to Airline Fitness and Citizenship,
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 19, 2009).
227
49 U.S.C. § 41305(a)(2) (“When an application is filed, the Secretary shall post a notice
of the application . . . An interested person may file a response with the Secretary opposing or
supporting the issuance of the permit.”).
228
Office of the Sec’y of Transp., supra note 226.
229
Office of Int’l Aviation Foreign Air Carrier Licensing Div., supra note 225.
230
Porcari, supra note 5 (“[A] decision whether or not to grant operating authority based on
compliance with Article 17 is at the heart of implementation of the ATA.”).
231
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 2 (amending Article 6 of the 2007 Agreement);
Office of the Sec’y Transp., Application Procedures for Foreign Air Carriers of the European
Union, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 19, 2009).
232
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 2 (amending Article 6 of the 2007 Agreement).
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agreement simply creates a fast-lane for approving foreign air carrier permits
by reducing the evidentiary burden on the applicant.233 The purpose of the
agreement is to encourage greater cooperation in setting standards and
comity in implementing the ATA. The drafters clearly state that it does not
reduce or modify the conditions required by granting nations to properly
authorize a permit.234 Thus, a foreign air carrier must still meet the requisite
standards of the USDOT to be granted an authorization, even under
reciprocal recognition.
Conversely, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel
argues that the USDOT could not deny an air carrier permit to an ATA
member state under Article 17 bis.235 The DOJ attempts to diminish the
article’s power by merely examining it on an independent basis, separate and
distinct from the rest of the authorization process, for revoking a carrier
permit from an airline otherwise qualified to receive it. This misses the point
entirely. Under a proper reading of the Agreement, an airline would never be
qualified to receive Article 4 authorization unless it preliminarily satisfied
Article 17 bis. The provision imposes an Agreement-wide duty on the
Parties to act in a certain way, and it should not be read as an after-the-fact
consideration merely because it comes later in the Agreement. Accordingly,
the DOJ’s argument fails because the starting premise misconstrues the
proper process of evaluating an air carrier authorization application under the
USDOT rules and the ATA.
Parties are proscribed from intentionally undermining labor standards per
Article 17 bis in their actions under the ATA. The USDOT examines a host
of factors in evaluating whether to grant a foreign air carrier authorization,
including the public commentary on applications. If these pleadings reveal
sufficient evidence of poor labor practices by the applicant, then the USDOT
must deny authorization under Article 4 and 17 bis. Considering this

233

Office of the Sec’y of Transp., Office of Int’l Aviation, Application Procedures for
Foreign Air Carriers of the European Union, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (“Under this
arrangement, the U.S. Department of Transportation uses determinations made by aeronautical
authorities of Member States on the fitness and citizenship of their air carriers, rather than
basing these findings on detailed evidentiary submissions. . . .”).
234
2010 Agreement, supra note 148, Memorandum of Consultations, para. 5 (“The
delegations affirmed that the procedures for reciprocal recognition of regulatory
determinations with regard to airline fitness and citizenship in the new Article 6 bis are not
intended to modify the conditions prescribed under the laws and regulations normally applied
by the Parties. . . .”).
235
Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel: Interpretation of Article 17 Bis of the U.S.EU Air Transport Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Apr. 14, 2016).
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framework, the question remains whether the USDOT should have granted
NAI’s authorization application.
C. NAI Arbitration: Violations of Labor Standards Under the ATA
On December 2, 2016, the USDOT impermissibly approved NAI’s
application for a foreign air carrier permit.236 NAI labor practices arguably
undermine labor standards in the United States and parts of the EU. In
examining the extensive application docket of NAI, it’s clear NAI operates
to the detriment of labor.237 These filings (over three hundred) triggered the
USDOT to suspend its normal granting permission, resulting in the case
being brought to arbitration under Article 19 of the ATA.238 As explained
below, NAI uses atypical employment practices, which circumvent the
Parties’ respective labor laws altogether. This circumvention defies the
purpose of Article 17 bis and constitutes a clear violation of the prohibition
against intentionally undermining labor standards.
1. Relevant Background to NAI Application
Following the passage of the ATA, EU carriers began taking advantage of
the expansive airline market and new access it created. NAI, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Norwegian Air Shuttle (NAS), was created under an
Irish Air Operator Certificate (AOC) in 2013.239 Later that year it applied for
a foreign carrier permit, as permitted for Irish carriers under the ATA,240 to
begin operating a transatlantic route but was met with staunch opposition.241
Just thirteen days after NAI filed its application, Delta Air Lines, Inc., United
Airlines, Inc., and American Airlines, Inc. filed a joint response to NAI’s
236

Hugo Martin, Norwegian Air International Gets Final Approval for Flights to U.S.,
Despite Opposition, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-norwe
gian-air-20161202-story.html.
237
See complete docket of all filings regarding NAI application for a foreign air carrier
permit at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=DOT-OST-2013-0204.
238
2007 Agreement, supra note 94.
239
Valerie Silva, From Inauguration to Arbitration: Norwegian Air International’s Brief,
Entangled History, APEX (Aug. 9, 2016), http://apex.aero/2016/08/09/inauguration-arbitratio
n-norwegian-air-international-history.
240
This is also granted to Norwegian air carriers as Norway was admitted under the 2011
amendment to the ATA.
241
From the time of the application filing for a foreign air carrier permit with the USDOT
until the department finally issued a show cause order, over 300 pleadings, motions, letters,
and comments were directed at the department with varying degrees of support. See the
complete docket of all filings regarding NAI application for a foreign air carrier permit (DOTOST-2013-0204), https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=ASC&sb=comm
entDueDate&po=25&dct=N%2BFR%2BPR%2BO&D=DOT-OST-2013-0204.
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application calling into question its Irish AOC as a deliberate attempt to
circumvent Norwegian tax and labor laws.242 This claim was echoed by
various labor unions and organizations, similarly filing documents with the
court challenging NAI’s employment record and motives for inaugurating in
Ireland, stating that Ireland merely operated as a “flag of convenience” for
NAI.243
This opposition forced the USDOT to withhold granting NAI a foreign
carrier permit. Finally, on April 25, 2016, the USDOT issued a “show cause
order.”244 In the order the USDOT explained that the situation was “novel
and complex,” such that additional review was necessary.245 Though the
USDOT did stipulate that legal counsel had concluded Article 17 bis did not
create an independent basis for denying authorization where the carrier
otherwise met all the required standards of Article 4, it still refrained from
giving such authorization.246 The USDOT construction of Article 17 bis
incorrectly interprets the plain meaning of the text and the purpose behind
the article. Considering the aforementioned construction of Article 17 bis
and 4, the USDOT incorrectly granted NAI’s authorization since its
employment practices undermine labor. An examination of their labor
practices shows they contravene the principles and laws of the United States
and EU nations.
2. Evidentiary Analysis
The responsive pleadings to NAI’s application for authorization reveal
labor practices that undermine labor principles and high standards.
Examining the USDOT record, the Joint Answer of the three large U.S.
carriers (Delta, United, and American) accuses NAI of operating under an
Irish flag merely as a “flag of convenience” in order to avoid certain taxes
and continue to use suspect employment practices, which might otherwise
violate Norwegian law.247 Focusing primarily on the accusation of suspect

242

Joint Answer, supra note 3.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Transportation Trades Department (TTD),
AFL-CIO, European Cockpit Association (ECA), Association of Flight Attendants-CWA,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and Transport Workers
Union of America all jointly and separately filed motions with the court challenging NAI’s
application as contrary to the “public interest” due to their labor practices.
244
U.S. DOT Issues Proposed Order on Norwegian Order International, U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-issues-propos
ed-order-norwegian-order-international.
245
Id.
246
Silva, supra note 239.
247
Joint Answer, supra note 3.
243
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labor practices, the docket folder reveals a litany of organizations and
stakeholders who similarly argue that NAI’s labor practices are violations of
existing U.S. and EU law. For example, Peter DeFazio, Ranking Member of
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, challenged NAI’s authorization specifically because of its use
of “outsourced crews” contracted under Singapore law,248 believing that such
actions are “anathema to the strong labor protections” of Europe and the
United States.249 Defazio and the three U.S. carriers are not alone in voicing
these specific concerns.
During the initial response period for NAI’s application, labor
organizations raised concerns about NAI’s labor practices. They specifically
identified two critical questions regarding labor that the USDOT needed to
further inspect: (1) NAI’s proposed labor and staffing models and (2) the
terms and conditions of employment governing NAI’s flight crews.250 The
answers to these two questions reveal the reasonable concerns labor
organizations have surrounding a USDOT authorization’s effect on existing
labor standards.
First, NAI employs cabin crews and pilots through a decentralized,
atypical model. NAI an Irish carrier wholly owned by its Norwegian parent
company, NAS, has moved most of its business away from Norway,
establishing bases in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the U.K., Spain, Bangkok,
and the United States.251 At these foreign bases, NAI uses temporary work
agencies to recruit both general employees and cabin crews, resulting in “less
than half of the total cabin crew” of NAI being permanently employed.252
Second, NAI pilots are employed through one of three methods: (1)
permanently employed, (2) hired through temporary work agencies, or (3)
self-employed who generally hire themselves out to a temporary work
agency.253 Under methods two and three, NAI is not always contracting with
248

Singapore offers protections for domestic labor but does not have the same
comprehensive scheme for foreign nationals independently contracted under their domestic
laws.
249
Letter from Peter DeFazio, Rep. House Comm. Transp. & Infrastructure, to Violeta Bulc,
EU Comm’n for Transp. (July 28, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OS
T-2013-0204-15116.
250
Answer of Allied Pilots Association to Summary of Information Provided by the
European Delegation Regarding Application of Norwegian Air International Limited for an
Exemption and Foreign Air Carrier Permit, Application of Norwegian Air International
Limited, No. OST-2013-0204 (Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Answer of Allied Pilots
Association].
251
Y. JORENS, D. GILLIS, L. VALCKE & J. DE CONINCK, ATYPICAL FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT IN
THE AVIATION SECTOR 56 (European Comm’n ed., 2015).
252
Id.
253
Id. at 68.
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the individual employee; instead, the pilot usually contracts with the
temporary work agency under a self-employed status or as an employee of
the agency.254 NAI then negotiates with the hiring agency to determine flight
assignments between the pilot and the airline.255
In comparison, SAS and Widerøe, the other two largest Norwegian air
carriers, use a more traditional employment model.256 These companies
largely employ both cabin crews and pilots through permanent contracts.257
They do not rely on third parties to hire personnel, and they generally prefer
to handle most employment decisions within the confines of the company.258
Under this centralized employment model, the employment contracts of both
cabin crews and pilots are controlled by Norwegian contract and labor law.
NAI’s hiring methods have triggered concerns about poorer working
conditions, lower compensation, and general job insecurity—or “social
dumping.”259 Under these contracts, pilots are held to be employees of the
hiring agency, not the airline; therefore, the contract law of the nation where
the hiring agency is domiciled would control.260 For example, NAS and NAI
use OSM Aviation Ltd., a NAS-majority owned employment agency, for
some of its hiring but multi-sources a lot of its temporary hiring through
regional agencies.261 One such regional temporary hiring agency, Global
Crew Asia Pte. Ltd. (Global Crew),262 allegedly is an attempt by NAI to
circumvent standard labor protections of Norway and the EU.263 As
employees of Singaporean Global Crew, NAI’s pilots and crews are
generally paid local salaries, which can be lower than their European
counterparts.264 Additionally, these hiring agencies are permitted to charge
recruitment fees (headhunting fees), which are carried by the hired workers

254

Id. at 69.
Id.
256
Id. at 68.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 56.
259
Philip von Schöppenthau, European Cockpit Ass’n, Answer of European Cockpit
Association to Application of Norwegian Air International Limited for an Exemption and
Foreign Air Carrier Permit, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Dec. 17, 2013).
260
JORENS, GILLIS, VALCKE & DE CONINCK, supra note 251, at 69.
261
Commission Decision (EC) No. 139/2004 of 31 May 2016, art. 6(1)(b), 2016 O.J. (C
248) 2, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7949_400_3.pdf.
262
The U.K. company registrar, Companies House, lists Global Crew Asia Pte. Ltd. as an
airline pilot employment company, operating out of Gatwick Airport but based in Singapore.
More information can be obtained at https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/BR017415.
263
See Comments of Southwest Airlines Pilots Association Opposing Approval of
Norwegian Air International Limited for a Foreign Air Carrier Permit, No. OST-2013-0204
(Dec. 23, 2013).
264
See generally JORENS, GILLIS, VALCKE & DE CONINCK, supra note 251, at 69.
255
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themselves not the air carriers.265 These “migration loans” can provide
leverage against workers wanting to speak out.266 Additionally, Singapore
law does not provide for unemployment benefits for either domestic or
foreign workers.267 Thus, workers hired under this framework will face
substantial limitations to their ability to collectively bargain because of the
fractured nature of their employment and the little leverage they hold against
management.
Labor organizations who opposed NAI’s application pointed to this
employment structure as evidence that they undermine Western labor
standards. They argue that NAI obtained an Irish AOC in order to
intentionally circumvent stricter Norwegian labor laws on collective
bargaining, allowing them to create a competitive advantage by offering
lower fares because they are not paying normal labor costs.268 In response,
NAI asserted that they would rely primarily on flight crews based in Europe
and the United States, generally placing the most employees in the areas
servicing the most routes.269 If a crewmember is asked to fly a transatlantic
or long haul flight, it is due to “extraordinary and unforeseen operations
reasons” rather than intentional circumvention.270 Moreover, NAI rebutted
accusations of ‘social dumping,’ citing competitive compensation levels
across all of its bases.271 And while many contracts are controlled by Thai or
Singaporean law, Kjos stressed that use of employment agencies was a
transitional strategy, and employees purportedly have always been given an
option to have employment contracts governed under the Norwegian law.272
NAI’s atypical employment method undermines U.S. and EU labor
protections for employees meant to be effectuated by Article 17 bis. In the
complex world of international corporate laws governing civil aviation,
airlines must remain competitive to stay above the global competition.
Reducing labor costs is an effective means for doing this; however, those
reductions cannot come at the cost of providing essential protections. The

265
Yap Mui Teng, Singapore’s System for Managing Foreign Manpower, in MANAGING
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA 238 (R.H. Adams, Jr. & A.
Ahsan eds., 2014).
266
Id.
267
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: SINGAPORE (2003).
268
Answer of Allied Pilots Association, supra note 250.
269
Letter from Bjørn Kjos, CEO Norwegian Grp., to Anthony Foxx, Sec’y of Transp., Dep’t
of Transp. (June 1, 2015), http://3rxg9qea18zhtl6s2u8jammft-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-co
ntent/uploads/2015/06/20150601160858-3.pdf.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
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employment practices of NAI harm both individual employees and labor
practices more generally.
First, NAI’s use of third-party hiring through temporary work agencies
harm the individual employees by denying them both labor protections and
social benefits. A European pilot hired through a work agency like Global
Crew is not employed by NAI. When issues on flights arise or concerns over
work conditions occur, the employee will not be able to resolve these with
NAI. The employee must address said concerns with Global Crew, which
could mean his unilateral termination or removal from those routes. Under
the model there is no formal mechanism for improving working conditions or
advancing oneself in NAI since the employee does not actually work for
NAI. As an employee of the Singaporean company, employee public health
benefits typically provided through an employer will not be required. For
example, the employee will lose out on essential insurance and
unemployment benefits. These concerns certainly threaten to undermine an
individual’s ability to protect himself from potential harms created from an
imbalance in bargaining power.
Second, at a macro level, labor standards will be undermined because
permitting NAI to continue to exercise under this model will either
encourage other air carriers to follow suit or compel them in order to reduce
labor costs to remain competitive in the market. This decentralized
employment model would impede most collective bargaining arrangements.
Considering the different approaches advanced at the second labor forum,
none of them are viable if these systems can proliferate.273 Transnational
agreements require an organized labor body to function as the corporate
body, but these temporary hiring agencies can refuse to hire pilots or crews
affiliated with such groups, effectively eliminating them.
Whereas,
European Works Councils, transnational conventions, and common standards
would be incapable of advancing labor protections because those agreements
bind nations’ conduct and companies working within those legal parameters.
As seen from NAI, those standards are a small impediment to a company that
completely circumvents those laws and standards.
Indeed, under this model there is little to no protection afforded to labor
individually or collectively. The USDOT should have given greater weight
to the public interest test to determine whether granting an authorization
would intentionally undermine labor standards of the United States or the
EU, which would have likely led to a denial of a foreign air carrier permit for
NAI. It is apparent that their third-party hiring strategies undermine labor by
273
As mentioned in Section II, part D, pp. 527–33, note the different models for collective
bargaining.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

554

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

4/18/2018 1:56 PM

[Vol. 46:515

attempting to avoid high standards. Though the issue has been settled, the
USDOT should, nevertheless, remain adamant in the future to avoid
approving suspect labor practices for subsequent carriers.
V. LOOKING FORWARD
The USDOT has explicitly stated Article 17 bis cannot be an independent
ground for denying authorization to an otherwise qualified carrier, and it has
granted NAI’s application despite genuine labor concerns. In response to
NAI’s application and the subsequent arbitration, representatives in Congress
drafted a resolution, H.R. 2997, that would empower the Secretary of
Transportation to act on labor violations under Article 17 bis. However, if
passed this resolution might impede ongoing cooperation from the EU or
even risk dissolution of the entire open skies framework. At the same time,
the third stage of the open skies agreement may provide a more effective and
balanced approach to these issues, without risking the entirety of the
agreement.
A. Impending U.S. Resolutions
On June 22, 2017, Representative Bill Shuster (Pennsylvania), along with
Representatives LoBiondo, Graves, Mitchell, Hanabusa, and Sinema
introduced H.R. 2997, cited as the “21st Century Aviation Innovation,
Reform, and Reauthorization Act” or “21st Century AIRR Act.”274 Though
the AIRR Act would primarily privatize U.S. air traffic control, as amended,
it would also bar the Secretary of Transportation from issuing permits or
exceptions for foreign air carriers when an “interested party” has raised the
“applicability of Article 17 bis” of the ATA.275 Nevertheless, the Secretary
could grant a permit if she (1) “finds that issuing the permit or exception
would be consistent with the intent [of Article 17 bis]” and
“imposes . . . such conditions as may be necessary to ensure that the person
complies with the intent of Article 17 bis.”276 Under subsection (b), the
AIRR Act would fundamentally amend the “public interest test” used by the
USDOT in granting foreign air carrier permits to include “preventing
274
21st Century Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act, H.R. 2997, 115th
Cong. (2017) [hereinafter AIRR Act].
275
Id. § 631(a). Section 631 is an amendment proposed by New Jersey Rep. LoBiondo to
undue the NAI decision by incorporating H.R. 5090, a bill that died in committee last term.
See H.R. 5090, 114th Cong. (2016) (prohibiting the Secretary of Transp. from approving
foreign air carrier permits, unless doing so would be consistent with Article 17 bis of the
ATA, including empowering the Secretary to impose conditions to meet that standard).
276
AIRR Act, supra note 274, § 631(a)(1)–(2).
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entry . . . by flag of convenience carriers.”277 As of this writing in 2017, the
resolution only has twenty-two cosponsors and has not left committee.
Section 631 of the bill does exactly what the general counsel argued
Article 17 bis was unable to do—act as an independent means for denying an
air carrier permit. Though, the AIRR Act does not require evidence of
Article 17 bis violation only its “applicability,” which is a lower threshold.278
Under traditional canons of interpretation, the AIRR Act would abrogate the
ATA because it would be ‘last in time’ and has a clear Congressional
purpose to override the ATA.279 Undoubtedly, approval of the bill would
trigger an immediate response from the EU. The EU has been outspoken
about their desire to liberalize the international airline industry and create a
single aviation market, so this will likely appear as a threat to that goal.
However, the EU cannot act as easily as the United States to curb this
threat. Since the EU has no singular law-making ability, it would be
restricted to adopting a directive encompassing similar restrictions that
Member States would be free to individually accept. Otherwise, the EU
could unilaterally reject the ATA altogether. Although, this latter choice
would appear drastic and would threaten the entire international airline
industry. Nonetheless, the EU may be able to leverage this power to
encourage Congress or President Trump to either reject H.R. 2997 or create
more cooperative measures at a third stage of negotiations. Either way H.R.
2997 threatens the stability of open skies agreements between the United
States and the EU.
B. Multinational Options
Absent a willingness to reach a bipartisan understanding of Article 17 bis
by both the United States and the EU, the issue should be addressed through
a third stage of negotiations on the ATA. Both the parties and external
commentators noted the vast amount of work that still is required before the
single aviation market can be reached, but by continuing to encourage

277

Id. § 631(b). According to the AIRR Act, a “flag of convenience carrier” would include
a “foreign air carrier that is established in a country other than the home country of its
majority owner or owners in order to avoid regulations of the home country.” Id. § 631(c).
278
Id. § 631(a).
279
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that treaties and
Congressional acts should be construed to give both effect; however, if in conflict then “the
one last in date will control the other . . .”); accord Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120
(1933) (explaining that treaty abrogation by subsequent statute is only appropriate if
Congressional intent is clearly expressed).
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liberalization the goal can be reached.280 During those negotiations, labor
must remain at the forefront of the parties’ agendas.
The EU is far more concerned with opening ownership rights for carriers
in the U.S. market, but the United States has rebuked these attempts because
of the fear that the domestic industry will be eliminated. Labor organizations
similarly fear an opening of ownership rights because it may mean a “race to
the bottom” where little protection is afforded. If the parties can
constructively outline a plan to make some concessions to ownership rights,
the United States may be able to bargain for greater labor protections going
forward.
However, considering President Trump’s proposed plan to re-negotiate
bad deals and bring jobs back to the nation, this goal may be less achievable
than previously believed. While still very unknown, some initial indications
show that President Trump may advance more protectionist arguments in
negotiating deals. This will likely limit any further progress on increased
liberalization, and it may have a negative impact by creating increased
limitations on the existing agreement.
Whatever the next steps taken, the stakeholders on both sides of the
Atlantic should consider the lessons of the 1980s airline deregulation. Labor
and management are both necessary to the progress of the airline industry,
and opening markets can equally advance the interests of both if done
through a cooperative framework. That framework may be limited if strict
protectionist measures are advanced by either Party. Instead, competition
should be promoted, and it can be advanced alongside proper standards for
contracting employees and requisite schemes in certain jurisdictions.
Airlines in the market must remain flexible and competitive to respond to
changing demands, but they must equally remain considerate of the vast
array of stakeholders who are codependent on them for their livelihood.

280
In light of Brexit, third stage negotiations are a foregone conclusion to occur; however,
the manner in which Brexit plays into the negotiations is beyond the purview of this Note.

